ISSN 0798 1015

Vol. 40 (Number 25) Year 2019. Page 6

The first results of the European Union's external energy policy

Los primeros resultados de la política energética exterior de la Unión Europea

PASHKOVSKAYA, Irina 1

Received: 07/02/2019 • Approved: 07/07/2019 • Published 22/07/2019

Contents

1. Introduction

2. Methodology

3. Results

4. Conclusions

Bibliographic references

1. Introduction

Challenges to energy security are experiencing the vitality of the European Union. The main unresolved problems of energy supply of the European Union stay insufficient energy production in a number of EU member states and throughout the European Union; excessive energy consumption of EU member states; increasing competition between world power centers for energy due to the ever-growing global energy demand; fluctuations in world energy prices; the danger of interruption of energy supplies to the internal energy market of the European Union; adverse environmental impact of EU member states.

The inability to cope with these challenges alone convinced EU to recognize that in order to achieve energy security they have to take concerted actions at the EU level and give the European Commission the role of a coordinator. In the period 2000-2011, in cooperation with the EU institutions the EU member states gradually and consistently formed the political and legal foundations of the EU energy policy, the most important component of which is external energy policy, primarily towards Russia and the new independent states.

Earlier studies allowed the authors to draw the following conclusions. The purpose of the European Union's external energy policy is to ensure the energy security of EU member states. The principle of the external energy policy of the European Union consist in the obligation of all members to “speak with one voice", that means to follow the same for all EU member states external energy policy.  The tasks of the external energy policy of the European Union comprise the preservation and development of energy relations with Russia as the main supplier of energy resources for EU; diversification of sources of supply and ways of delivery of imported energy to the internal energy market of the European Union from and through third countries.

1.1. Literature review

The issue of the common European energy policy has arisen form a need to handle the challenges of the shallowing intra-EU energy resources mentioned in the first State of Energy Union Report of the European Commission (2015)  and an urgency to diversify its energy imports in changing global environment (Franza et al, 2017). What is more, EU energy policy is not a mere technical topic but rather a political issue that has being discussed widely elsewhere, primarily within the American scholar community (Demsey et al, 2017; Zenko, 2016). The EU energy security policy is tightly related to the problem of climate change (Bergamaschi et al, 2016) and Russian oil and gas exports (Koranyi, 2018), at least in the media and political context. Thus, economic aspects intertwine with the political features of the EU common energy policy (Raines et al, 2016). Russia is the long-standing EU energy partner and accounts for the majority of energy exports to Europe, however, after the 2014 a dilemma within European political discourse has been whether to halt or to deepen energy cooperation with Russia (Hadfield, 2017). As a matter of fact, the EU has articulated its vision of Energy policy up to 2050 concentrating primarily on greenhouse gas emission cut and publishes reports on its progress (European Commission 2017). From all conventional energy sources, natural gas is one of the least damaging to the environment, so Russian exports may contribute to the further accomplishments of European energy goals (Youngs, 2007).

In order to conduct in-depth research and obtain the most complete and objective conclusions, the research was based on the historical, logical, comparative and analytical methods of scientific cognition and the methodology of system analysis.

The results of the implementation of the external energy policy give us the understanding about its effectiveness over the past years. According to the European Commission (COM(2017) 688, 2017), energy is the main focus of EU cooperation with its neighbors. In 2017, the European Commission represented the results of the implementation of the energy policy of the European Union in three reports (COM(2017) 53, 2017; SWD(2017) 32, 2017; COM(2017) 688, 2017), which contain information about the level of development of the energy sector and the degree of energy self-sufficiency of EU member states.

These reports and a number of other documents of the European Union set forth key facts and figures on the dependence of EU member states on energy imports to the internal energy market of the European Union. The European Union is the world's largest energy importer. EU member states purchase in third countries more than half of the consumed energy at the cost of 400 billion euros (COM(2015) 80, 2015).

The European Union has at its disposal a wide choice of foreign suppliers of all types of fossil fuels. However, the supplier concentration index from 8.1 in 2005 increased to 9.7 in 2014. The growth of the supplier concentration index indicates a slight deterioration in the energy security of the European Union.

Energy imports increased significantly in the UK, Denmark and Poland as a result of declining domestic production of fossil fuels. In Lithuania energy imports increased due to the closure of a nuclear power plant. Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Finland and Estonia almost entirely depend on gas, oil and coal supplies from Russia. In general, EU member states show varying degrees of dependence on energy imports. Estonia is the least dependent on energy imports - 8.9%, followed by increasing energy import dependence: Denmark - 12.8%, Romania - 17.0%, Poland - 28.6%, Czech Republic - 30.4%, Sweden - 32.0%, the Netherlands - 33.8%, Bulgaria - 34.5%. The most dependent on energy imports are Lithuania - 77.9%, Belgium - 80.1%, Ireland - 85.3%, Cyprus - 93.4%, Luxembourg - 96.6%, Malta - 97.7% (European Commission, 2016).

Oil, gas and coal account for 72% of energy consumption in EU (Speech/18/3242, 2018). Mostly it is dependent on oil imports. In comparison with 2014 in 2015 this dependence increased from 81.3% to 87.9% (SWD(2017) 32, 2017). During this period, oil production in the European Union has halved. The European Union pays more than 300 billion euros a year for the imports of oil and petroleum products, 30% of which comes from Russia.

Over the period 2005-2014, the EU’s dependence on coal imports increased from 55.7% to 67.9%, while domestic coal production in the European Union decreased by 40%. For 19 EU member states, dependence on coal imports exceeds 90%. The only exporter of coal in the European Union is the Czech Republic. Since 2014, even Poland, formerly the largest producer of coal, is an importer of coal (SWD(2017) 32, 2017).

The EU’s dependence on nuclear fuel imports is 40%. 90% of uranium used in reactors of nuclear power plants the European Union imports from third countries (SWD(2017) 32, 2017).

EU member states annually consume about 480 billion cubic meters of natural gas that is a quarter of the whole volume of energy used by the European Union (Factsheet, 2018). About 51% of the total volume of gas consumed is used for heating buildings and structures and for other household purposes, 26% - in the power industry, 23% - in other industries (SWD(2017) 32, 2017).

There are two net gas exporters in the European Union: Denmark and the Netherlands. The largest gas producers in EU are the Netherlands, which produce 47% of gas, the UK producing 25%, Germany and Romania, producing 6.7% and 6.5% of gas respectively (European Commission, 2016). However, the volume of gas produced in the European Union is half that required for the functioning of the economies of EU member states. According to the European Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy M.A Cañete in July 2018 (IP/18/4920, 2018), "natural gas production in EU countries is declining faster than expected." According to the data for the second quarter of 2018, for the year gas production decreased by 12% (COM(2017) 53, 2017; SWD(2017) 32, 2017; COM(2017) 688, 2017). In the Netherlands for the specified period, gas production decreased by 23%. Moreover, the Dutch parliament passed a law about the reduction and future stop of gas production at the Groningen field (Quarterly Report, 2018).

Due to the decrease in domestic gas production, the share of imported gas in the total volume of gas consumed by the European Union from 2005 to 2014 increased from 57.1% to 67.4%. For 16 EU member states dependence on gas imports exceeds 90%. The smallest volumes of gas are imported by Romania (5% of gas consumed) and Croatia  (28.6%).

As the European Commissioner for Energy M.A. Cañete said (Speech/18/3242, 2018), in 2016, about 76% of gas imported by EU member states came from Russia and Norway, 11% came from Algeria and Libya, and the remaining 13% came from liquefied natural gas (LNG) from various producers. According to another source, 39% of gas imported by the European Union is produced in Russia, 30% in Norway, 13% in Algeria (Factsheet, 2018). Over the year, from the second quarter of 2017 to the second quarter of 2018, gas imports to the European Union increased by 3%. Gas imports from Russia and Algeria for the period increased by 10%. Gas imports from Libya and Norway, as well as LNG imports, have declined (Quarterly Report, 2018).

The main ways of gas delivery to the EU domestic energy market remain Russian gas pipelines, which account for 46% of gas imports to EU member states. Norwegian gas pipelines supply 31% of gas imports, LNG imports - 14%, gas pipelines from North African countries - 9%. From 2017 to 2018, the cost of gas imports increased by 29% and amounted to 21 billion euros (Quarterly Report, 2018).

The biggest success for the European Union was achieved in the execution of a common energy policy for all EU member states “speaking with one voice”. By relying on such external reserves as energy diplomacy the EU managed to provide all member states with a sufficient amount of imported energy at an affordable price.

The imported energy enters the internal energy market of the European Union from foreign suppliers via international energy networks. However the European Union is concerned by the fact that a number of EU member states are still almost entirely dependent on a single source of supply and a single way of delivery. In particular, Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia, Finland and Estonia are dependent on gas supplies from Russia. Some EU member states are in the same position with respect to oil or coal, as well as nuclear fuel (COM(2017) 688,  2017).

To avoid the dependence of EU member states on a single energy supplier, the EU has set the task of diversifying supply sources and ways of delivering energy resources to the EU's internal energy market. This task is solving by developing external energy networks in three directions.

The first direction of diversification of sources of supply and ways of delivering energy to the European Union is to supply the EU member states with Russian gas through pipelines from Russia. The construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline has been completed and now it is functioning. The construction of the Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline from Russia is in full swing. According to the European Commission in the second quarter of 2018 44% of gas supplies from Russia to the European Union were delivered via gas pipelines through Ukraine, 33% came through the Nord Stream gas pipeline, 23% were delivered through gas pipelines through Belarus (Quarterly Report, 2018).

In June 2017, the European Commission submitted a Recommendation to the EU Council on empowering the European Commission to negotiate an agreement with Russia on the operation of the Nord Stream - 2 gas pipeline (COM(2017) 688, 2017). European Commissioner for Energy MA Cañete (Speech/18/3242, 2018) said at the Fourth Energy Summit of the European Union in April 2018: “Based on our short-term geopolitical and energy situation, Russia will remain a key supplier of energy for the European Union.”

The second direction of diversifying supply sources and ways of delivering energy to the European Union is to provide EU member states with gas via the Southern Gas Corridor pipeline from the countries of the Caspian, Central Asian, Middle Eastern and Mediterranean regions. The estimated capacity of the Southern Gas Corridor is 10 billion cubic meters of gas with the potential of increasing gas supplies to 80-100 billion cubic meters per year (Memorandum of understanding, 2018). The initial cost of the Southern Gas Corridor project is estimated at $ 45 billion.

The groundbreaking ceremony for the Southern Gas Corridor pipeline was held in September 2014 in Baku. The Southern Gas Corridor route is laid parallel to the already existing Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline. The pipeline system of the Southern Gas Corridor includes a part of the Trans-Adriatic pipeline which has a length of 870 kilometers and is aimed to deliver Azerbaijani gas through Georgia, Turkey, Greece, Albania and along the bottom of the Adriatic Sea to Italy (Pashkovskaya, 2016). The Trans-Adriatic pipeline will be connected at the border of Greece with Turkey to the Trans-Anatolian pipeline, which was set into operation in June 2018.

The third direction of diversification of supply sources and ways of delivering energy to the European Union is to provide EU member states with liquefied natural gas purchased from the international LNG market that has been booming in the past decade. The competitiveness of the global LNG market is growing rapidly due to its inherent flexibility. The International Energy Agency predicts that from 2017 to 2023 global LNG trade will increase from 391 billion cubic meters to 505 billion cubic meters, that is 114 billion cubic meters (IP/18/4920, 2018).  It is indicated in the European Union Strategy for liquefied natural gas and gas storage represented by the European Commission in 2016 (COM(2016) 49, 2016), that in the coming years is expected a 50% increase in the global LNG market and, accordingly, a decrease in LNG prices.

The largest seller of LNG is Qatar, which supplies approximately 100 billion cubic meters to the world market of LNG per year. Other largest suppliers of LNG to the world market are Indonesia, Malaysia and Nigeria (Factsheet, 2018). Great development in the world LNG market is predicted for Angola, Egypt, Israel, Iraq, Iran, Canada, Cyprus, Lebanon, Libya, Mozambique, Tanzania (COM(2016) 49, 2016).

The European Union is the second largest LNG importer in the world after Japan. The International Energy Agency predicts an increase in LNG imports to the EU by 20% by 2040 (IP/18/4920, 2018). In 2017 the European Union imported from Qatar 41% of LNG, 19 % -from Nigeria, 17 % from Algeria, 7 % from Norway and Peru each, 4% from the USA, 3 % from Trinidad and Tobago. In just one year, from 2016 to 2017, LNG imports by EU member states grew by 12% and amounted to 55 billion cubic meters. The share of LNG imports in the total EU gas imports in 2017 amounted to 14% (Factsheet, 2018). In the period from the second quarter of 2017 to the second quarter of 2018 LNG imports decreased by 2%, but were 30% higher than in the first quarter of 2018. This is due to the increase in LNG prices on the Asian LNG market, followed by the redirection of LNG suppliers’ proposals from Europe to Asia (Quarterly Report, 2018). In the European Union Spain is the largest importer of LNG, which accounts for 31% of all EU imports of LNG. France follows Spain - 20% of LNG imports, and then goes Italy - 15% and the United Kingdom - 12% (Factsheet, 2018).

The transformation of the European Union into one of the world's largest importers of LNG has become possible due to the fact that the EU member states have created the necessary infrastructure for receiving LNG. In 2015 the capacity of the terminals (for regasification) of LNG was 195 billion cubic meters per year. LNG terminals with a capacity of 23 billion cubic meters per year were in the process of construction. Now under consideration are the construction projects of LNG terminals with a capacity of 146 billion cubic meters (COM(2016) 49, 2016). Taking into account that the European Union consumes about 480 billion cubic meters of gas per year and about half of this volume is produced by EU member states the capacity of LNG terminals can now fully satisfy the EU’s need for gas imports.

Considering first of all the commercial attractiveness of the global LNG market the EU member states are actively constructing LNG terminals and the technical means to connect them to the gas pipelines of other EU members. The amount of co-financing of the European Union in the construction of LNG terminals in EU member states is 638 million euros (IP/18/4920, 2018). At the beginning of 2016 there were 32 LNG terminals in the European Union: 9 LNG terminals in Spain; 4 each - in the UK, Finland, France; 3 in Italy; 2 - in Sweden, 1 LNG terminal - in Belgium, Greece, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal (SWD(2016) 23, 2016).

In the period from 2013 to 2017 LNG terminals were built in the following European countries: in France with a capacity of 13 billion cubic meters per year, in Poland on the basis of co-financing of the European Union with a capacity of 5 billion cubic meters per year, in Lithuania on the basis of co-financing of the European Union with a capacity of 4.0 billion cubic meters per year, in Italy with a capacity of 3.8 billion cubic meters per year, in Malta, on the basis of co-financing of the European Union with a capacity of 0.7 billion cubic meters per year (IP/18/4920, 2018). From the presented data it follows that the LNG terminals are located mainly in Western Europe and there are only two LNG terminals in Eastern Europe.

LNG terminals under construction from 2018 to 2022 are in Greece (with a capacity of 2 billion cubic meters per year) and in Spain (with a capacity of 1.3 billion cubic meters per year). In Greece the terminals are constructing on the basis of co-financing by the European Union From 2019 to 2022 the LNG terminals included in the list of projects of general interest of the European Union, that is, the LNG terminals, the creation of which the European Union attaches particular importance, should be built in Ireland (with a capacity of 6.2 billion cubic meters per year), in Greece on the basis of co-financing of the European Union (5.5 billion cubic meters per year), in Croatia on the basis of co-financing of the European Union  (2.6 billion cubic meters per year), in Poland  (2.5 billion cubic meters per year), in Sweden  (0.5 billion cubic meters per year), as well as in Cyprus on the basis of co-financing of the European Union (IP/18/4920, 2018).

An important factor in the gas industry of the European Union is the underutilization of the operating LNG terminals of EU member states at 150 billion cubic meters per year (IP/18/4920, 2018). The utilization rate of LNG terminals decreased from 53% in 2010 to 25% in 2013 and 19% in 2014. The global average utilization of LNG terminals is 33%. The low loading of LNG terminals is due to high LNG prices on Asian gas markets and low pipeline gas prices. Low loading of LNG terminals is also due to the fact that not all EU member states have access to LNG terminals and thus are unable to use this form of gas (SWD(2016) 23, 2016).

The arrival of the USA and Australia to the global LNG market has given new impetus to its development. Since April 2016 in the next three years, the United States made 40 deliveries of LNG to EU member states in Portugal, totaling 2.8 billion cubic meters. In 2016, the US sold 5% of its LNG exports to EU member states, and in 2017 it doubled. In 2018, the capacity of the US LNG terminals was 28 billion cubic meters. According to the plans by 2023 the capacity of the US LNG terminals will be 108 billion cubic meters (IP/18/4920, 2018).

Officially, the interaction of the European Union with the United States is implemented in the format of the EU-US Energy Council. In July 2018 in Washington the President of the European Commission Zh.K. Juncker held a meeting with US President D. Trump, on the basis of which the parties adopted a joint statement of the United States and the European Union (Statement/18/4687, 2018).

By a joint statement, the parties stated that the population of the United States and the European Union together amounts to more than 830 million citizens accounting for more than 50% of world GDP. The volume of bilateral trade between the European Union and the United States, which has no equal in the world, amounts to $ 1 trillion. The meeting was declared as “a new stage in relations between the United States and the European Union - a stage of close friendship, strong trade relations, ... better teamwork in the interests of global security, prosperity and the fight against terrorism”.

The main outcome of the meeting was that the European Union agreed to increase purchases of US LNG. The phrase of the Joint Statement “... we have agreed to strengthen our strategic cooperation in the field of energy. The European Union wants to import more liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the United States to diversify its energy supply”, marks a transition to a new level of EU-US relations in the energy sector. The European Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy MA. Cañete (IP/18/4920, 2018), assessing the significance of the agreement reached between the European Union and the United States, said: “Diversification is an important element in ensuring the security of gas supplies to the European Union. Therefore an increase in imports of liquefied natural gas from the United States should be welcomed”.

In confirmation of the agreement reached on strengthening strategic cooperation between the European Union and the United States in the energy sphere, the President of the European Commission, J.K. Juncker noted: "The European Union is ready to promote an increase in imports of liquefied natural gas from the United States." However the President of the European Commission added that the European Union sets two conditions for the United States. The first condition is: “if prices for American LNG are competitive,” that is, affordable, acceptable to EU member states. The second condition: the United States must eliminate restrictions on LNG exports to the European Union. No less significant is the statement of Zh.K. Juncker on the "importance of working together".

The European Union has already done much to ensure the energy security of EU member states. Significant progress was noted in the diversification of sources of supply and ways of delivering energy to the EU’s internal energy market from and through third countries. The European Union has achieved serious success in reducing the dependence of EU member states on a limited number of external energy suppliers.

However the European Commission (COM(2017) 688, 2017) does not hide: "Energy poverty in the European Union affects about 50 million people." This amazing information that every tenth citizen of the European Union is deprived of the opportunity to live and financially ensure the existence of his and his family in the context of generally accepted energy standards shows that the European Union does not work enough to ensure the energy security of its citizens. The lack of elementary necessities for a significant part of the population entails a dangerous stratification of society. Contrasting different parts of society on the basis of energy supply can lead to explosions of protests in EU member states like the one that occurred in France in the autumn of 2018. This creates a new layer of social problems in the European Union. 

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1. Doctor of Political Sciences, Leading Research Fellow. Center for Euro-Atlantic Security. Institute for International Studies. Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Contact e-mail: irina-pashkovsky@mail.ru